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This paper will examine how the conditional value at risk of the United States financial 
market can be calculated using exposure to foreign financial markets. Whether import or 
export partners have more of an effect on a country’s financial markets and the results of how 
both are strongly significant, yet how exports play a slightly larger role, will be examined. 
The paper will also examine how the US financial market has become more interconnected 
over the last 21 years. These calculations have been conducted using the conditional value at 
risk measure via quantile regressions.  
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Globalization is here. It has provided us with access to many products and services that we 
previously would not have had through an increase in foreign trade. Additionally, it has 
brought an increase in the interconnectedness of the global economy and led to links between 
countries’ financial systems all around the world. 
 On September 17, 2015, we observed the US Federal Reserve leaving rates unchanged 
due to fears within emerging market economies. This serves as proof of how the system is 
becoming more and more interconnected. A major decision in the world’s largest economy, 
the United States, was made based on the effect it could have on a global scale.  
 The majority of value at risk measures focus primarily on domestic firms and their 
effect on the national economy. This is very important for risk management and measurement 
although it provides a limited view in terms of the measurement of international contagion of 
distress in financial markets. This paper will explore a new measure which uses a risk 
matching approach to measure how a country’s risk exposure can be derived from its trading 
partners.  
 The research focus is primarily on the effects of the major trade partners of the US on 
its financial markets. This is done using Adrian and Brunnermeier’s CoVaR measure to 
examine how changes in a major trade partner’s financial markets affect the US markets, and 
how this relationship has evolved over time. 
 Through increased foreign trade you would expect an increase in the connectedness of 
countries' economies and financial markets. This research focuses on how markets are 
connected when the US market is in a period of crisis. Intuitively, if a partner’s economy is 
struggling it should have a contagious effect through trade on its partner’s economy. I find 
both import and export partners’ financial indexes to provide the best risk matching profile in 
stress times. The addition of commodity returns proves to even further improve this risk 
match. 
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 This research uses CoVaR to measure cross-border contagion of financial events and 
determine the effects major market movements in one country have on another country. I will 
also show how there is a negligible difference upon whether the partner country is a major 
import or export partner, it is simply the connection through trade which is important.  
  Finally, I examine the interconnectedness of the global financial system over the last 
20 years. I find that we have seen a significant increase in the risk matching across countries’ 
financial markets. This is used as the basis to show how we are observing a period of growing 
global connectedness within the financial system.  
 The paper is organized in 5 sections.  Section 1 is an overview of the recent financial 
crises, which have occurred over the last 40 years, and a look into their causes. Section 2 will 
be an analysis of the literature on topics related to my research. Some of the covered literature 
is also used to show the motivation behind this study. Section 3 will be an overview of the 
analytical process, focusing on the methodology used and the research design. Section 4 will 
have a presentation of the research results. The final 5th section will cover further research and 
the conclusion.  
1. Recent financial Crises 
1.1 Latin American Debt Crisis (the 1970s)  
In the 1970s, drastic fluctuation in the oil price caused deficits within the current accounts of 
several countries within Latin America. The US government urged large US banks to act as 
intermediaries providing oil-exporting countries a reliable and liquid place to store their 
surpluses and the banks then lent those funds to Latin America. The borrowing from US 
banks was initially slow, with the Latin American countries owing foreign creditors $29 
billion in 1970. By 1978, the debt had grown to $159 billion and by 1982 it had skyrocketed 
to $327 billion. In 1982, the finance minister of Mexico informed the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and US Treasury secretary that Mexico could no longer maintain its debt 
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payments on the outstanding $80 billion. Several other countries followed Mexico’s lead and, 
in the end, 16 Latin American countries needed to restructure their debt payments. This led to 
a cessation of overseas bank lending as the focus switched to collecting outstanding debts. 
(Sims & Romero, 2013)  
1.2 Savings and loan crisis (the 1980s) 
As interest rates rose in the early 1980’s, many firms in the savings and loans business 
struggled. The deposit rate which was set by the federal government was low, which resulted 
in customers withdrawing funds to put elsewhere where they could earn a better rate of return. 
Additionally, savings and loans firms had made significant loans for long-term fixed rate 
mortgages. As the interest rates rose, the mortgage values plummeted causing the firms to 
lose almost everything. Regulators did not have enough capital to sustain the losses the firms 
were suffering. This ultimately resulted in a bailout provided by the taxpayers. (Robinson, 
2013) 
1.3 Stock Market Crash (1987) 
Later to become famously known as “Black Monday”, the crash in the fall of 1987 was the 
first global financial crisis.  A series of events sent the stock market, as well as the futures and 
options markets, crashing downward to their worst single-day loss in market history. The 
Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 22.6% while the S&P 500 fell over 20%.  It showed 
how the trading systems in place could be pushed to the point of almost breaking in extreme 
conditions. This event was a prime demonstration of how interconnected our financial 
markets have become through technology. (Bernhardt & Eckblad, 2013; Carlson, 2007) 
1.4 High-yield Bond Crash (1989)  
Many companies throughout the 1980’s were engaged in aggressive restructuring and 
mergers. Most of these transactions were principally financed through debt. This led to an 
aggressive boom in the high-yield bond market, also known as the “Junk Bond Market”. In 
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1989, the amount of defaults began to skyrocket and defaults were in excess of $8 billion, 
with default rates being just under double the usual average of 2.2% coming in at 4.3%. The 
high risk in the market led to a large credit spread which grew to over 700 basis points. One 
investment bank which was responsible for a large number of these issuances, Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, filed for bankruptcy and its figurehead, Michael Milken, was indicted. 
(Altman, 2000) 
1.5 Mexican Financial Crisis (1994 - 1995) 
The 94/95 crisis which originated in Mexico is better known as the “Tequila Crisis”. It 
originated upon the devaluation of the Mexican peso in the later part of 1994. The crisis led to 
a severe depreciation of the peso and a drastic recession ensued.  In 1995, Mexico’s GDP fell 
over 6%. The weak regulation in the financial system and over-excited foreign investors are 
considered to be the primary causes of the crash. (Musacchio, 2012) 
1.6 Asia Crisis (1997 - 1998)  
There are 3 main causes of the Asian crisis. Firstly, the amount of foreign money which was 
flowing into Asia due to the low-interest rates led investors to seek new investment 
opportunities. The large inflow led to significant price appreciation in housing, and the stock 
market, this then led to even further inward flows. Unfortunately, the Asian firms were unable 
to efficiently use the funds, and their lack of financial transparency temporarily hid this fact 
from investors. The second main cause were the fixed exchange rate systems which the 
countries had in place. This provided investors with a false sense of security making the 
countries appear more stable than they truly were. The third and final cause was the 
establishment of increased trade within North America which was created through the 
foundation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. (Aghevli, 1999; Carson & Clark, 
2013) 
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1.7 Dot-com Bubble (Mid 1990’s - 2002)  
During this time, the way investments were analyzed changed, and investors were no longer 
relying on business fundamentals. Investors were overly optimistic about the future potential 
of technology and the many newly created companies which were operating in the online 
space. The investors were relying on newly created measures which attempted to forecast 
future earnings. Due to popular demand, companies began releasing “Pro-forma” financial 
statements with did not have to follow previously set accounting guidelines. This period led to 
the famous quote by the chairman of the US Federal Reserve at the time, Alan Greenspan, 
who warned investors about “irrational exuberance”.  This asset price bubble began deflating 
in early 2000 and continued to do so until near the end of 2002, with the terrorist attacks in 
New York City on September 11, 2001 having an accelerating effect on the bubble deflation. 
(Morris & Alam, 2008) 
1.8 Global Financial Crisis (2007 - 2009) 
The global financial crisis began in 2007 and had a ripple effect around the world. This is 
another great example of how interconnected our financial systems have become and how 
globalization has increased financial linkage between countries. The 2007 crisis was a 
banking crisis which affected the money supply and threatened the economy as a whole. In 
examining the 2007 crisis, Lastra and Wood attempt to determine whether it was a liquidity or 
capital caused crisis, and conclude that it is difficult to tell due to the speed with which the 
crisis took place. They go on to mention how several key factors led to the crisis, with some 
of the main culprits being macroeconomic imbalances with foreign countries, failures of 
regulation, a belief that some institutions were “too-big-to-fail”, excessive use of the 
securitization markets, poor risk management and several other causes. (Lastra & Wood, 
2010) The 2007 crisis led the US Federal Reserve to use unconventional monetary policy 
which has had a lasting effect on the US economy and has led to interest rates remaining low 
over the last 9 years.  
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1.9 Sovereign Debt Crisis (2009 - Present) 
The most recent crisis arose in Europe. The primary cause of this crisis was governments’ 
attempts to stabilize their banks during the global financial crisis. Banks play a major role in 
any economy and it is in the government’s best interest to ensure their country’s banks remain 
operational. This led to many European governments overleveraging themselves in order to 
maintain stability within the banking sector. This unfortunately led to a financial sector 
banking problem bleeding into a fiscal sector problem, which then presented itself in the 
sovereign debt markets. (Correa & Sapriza, 2014) Large amounts of debt from countries such 
as Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain were at risk as the countries could no longer 
sustain their debt. This led to the European Central Bank stepping in and taking 
unprecedented measures in an attempt to regain financial stability in the Eurozone.  
2. A Review of Relevant Literature 
The basis for this research is a 2011 paper in which Adrian and Brunnermeier outline their 
CoVaR measure. This measure was created as an extension of the pre-existing VaR measure 
with the addition of “Co” to represent conditional, contagion and comovement. The measure 
represents the VaR of the financial system conditional on one institution being in a state of 
stress. In addition, they create a !CoVaR measure which denotes the change or marginal 
contribution one institution has upon the system. This measure can be used to denote one 
institution’s contribution to overall systemic risk. They use the measure to find how much 
systemic risk commercial banks, insurance companies, real estate and broker-dealers 
contribute to the US financial markets. They also create a forward measure of !CoVaR which 
they use to monitor and predict the buildup of systemic risk in the financial system. The main 
benefit of this measure is its ability to predict risk counter-cyclically. (Adrian & 
Brunnermeier, 2011) 
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 Forbes and Rigobon look at comovement and attempt to determine the difference 
between contagion and interdependence. They note how the definition of contagion in itself 
has many different uses within literature. Thus they create their own definition “contagion as 
a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of 
countries)”(Forbes & Rigobon, 2002). Their definition acknowledges that some markets will 
always contain a large amount of comovement. They find that it’s only when an event can 
trigger and increase in this comovement that contagion is present. When a country’s financial 
market has a link with another this is denoted as interdependence. Similar to previously noted 
literature and one of the main research points of this paper the authors note how one of the 
main potential sources of transmission of financial stress from one country to another is 
through international trade. They also note how in general, correlations increase throughout 
the markets during crisis times. It must be noted that in order to be deemed contagion, there is 
one relationship between a pair of countries which increases more than the others. Their 
research finds that daily data with no lags provides the best result. They focus primarily on 
only the larger markets, the 10 largest in their case, due to the fact that liquidity can disappear 
during a crisis. They also note how contagion tests can be biased when the market is 
experiencing a large swing in the amount of volatility observed. Within their research they 
perform a correction to account for bias in the coefficient of correlation. In order to perform 
this correction, they make the assumption of no omitted variables or endogeneity. I find these 
unrealistic assumptions. I am working with only country returns and a small sample of 
commodity returns, so the assumption of no omitted variables is unlikely as the entire basis 
for this research is that markets are highly interconnected; thus, I do not perform their 
correlation correction. Secondly, Adrian and Brunnermeier note that there is endogeneity in 
systemic risk which translates into the CoVaR measure. (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2011) The 
central conclusion is that the markets do not exhibit contagion but higher comovement via 
increased interdependence in times of crisis. (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002) 
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 Looking at cross-listed stocks from US and Japan, how they move from a daily and 
intraday perspective, Karolyi and Stulz examine why markets move together. Their study 
focuses on a time frame from 1988 to 1992. The stocks which they observed are Japanese 
listed stocks which are cross-listed with American Depository Receipts (ADR) that are traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Their study finds that several factors which we 
may initially think have an effect on the return covariance do not. US macro news, foreign 
exchange shocks and changes in US treasuries do not present a measurable effect. They do 
find that large shocks to major market indices, the Nikkei and S&P 500 Index, have a positive 
effect on increasing the magnitude and also on the persistence of correlation observed 
between the two markets. Within their research, they also report a couple other useful findings 
relevant to the research conducted in this paper. Firstly, they note that global shocks are 
generally associated with higher return covariance, which demonstrates a spillover effect on 
market return covariance. Additionally, when we observe competitive shocks within an 
individual market, the result is generally a lower covariance. Looking at the weekly returns 
they find that covariance is generally higher on Mondays than other days during the week. 
Finally, they note how monthly unexpected changes in macro variables do not prove to be 
informative for explaining changes in monthly returns. They note how there is a problem 
when using daily returns due to the non-synchronous trading cycles all over the world.  
(Karolyi & Stulz, 1995)  
 The Financial Stress Spillover Index (FSSI) was created by Chau and Deesomsak; the 
index's purpose is to measure financial stress transmission.  FSSI is used to monitor for 
conditions which could create the possibility for excessive spillover, which in turn would lead 
to instability in the financial system. Their index is measuring spillovers across US debt, 
equity, banking and foreign exchange markets. Backtesting using their index, they find how 
generally as the crisis intensified so too did their index. They note how financial stress is the 
most systemic risk because its instability spreads easiest across the global system. Their index 
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shows the debt market appears to be the market which contributes most to spillovers with 
equity being second, and then foreign exchange and banking markets being a distant third and 
fourth. The banking system usually receives the brunt of the stress and its stress leads to 
spillovers. (Chau & Deesomsak, 2014) 
2.1 Contagion from the Latin American and Asian Crises 
Baig and Goldfain look at contagion amongst financial markets during the Asian crisis. There 
is evidence that within currency and equity markets, cross-border contagion is present. They 
look at several possible sources of transmission including: trade linkages, third party 
competition spillovers and change in financial market sentiment. They note that in a period of 
crisis, it is ideal for an investor to divest themselves from an entire group of related markets at 
the same time and not simply one or a few of the markets. Within their research they use a 
three-month rolling window. They use a shorter window so that they are able to observe 
interactions amongst markets which only have a quick effect.  Whereas if they used the entire 
sample these effects would be smaller. (Baig & Goldfajn, 1999) 
 An IMF paper on contagion of equity markets makes several relevant discoveries to 
my research. Their findings address the way in which contagion spreads. It can differ from 
one region to another and even within one region. This is observed using their contagion 
measure and historical evidence from the Asian and Latin American crises. Looking at the 
1998 Russian and Brazilian crises, they conclude that contagion is generally higher for 
negative events and market returns than positive ones. Based on the assumption that financial 
integration increases the possibility of contagion, they believe the developing markets are the 
most exposed as they have a higher reliance on more mature global markets. Their study uses 
a five-year rolling window to examine how inter-market dynamics are changing over time. 
This was used as motivation for the examination across time in my research. Prior to 1998, 
there had been minimal contagion from other foreign markets with the US, although from 
1998 through to 2001 there was an observed increase in contagion. After the Latin and Asian 
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crises, we observe increased contagion across the world as prior crises had been more 
geographically focused. This was observed through the contagion from Argentina and Korea, 
Chile and Hong Kong amongst others having increased. (Chan-Lau, Mathieson, & Yao, 2004) 
 Bordo and Murshid’s paper on financial contagion looks at contagion over a longer 
time frame, from pre-World War 1 through the Asian and Latin American crises.  They use 
weekly returns from bond prices and interest rates. Their research finds that there does not 
appear to be drastic increases in cross-market correlations in war times versus in the more 
recent Asian and Latin market crises. In fact, they actually note that the evidence is contrary 
to the belief that globalization has increased market co-movement, and they note how the co-
movement was stronger during unstable periods in earlier war times. This is directly in 
opposition to the hypothesis of my research that increased globalization has led to an increase 
in financial market connections. Their analysis reveals crisis periods are not required to 
increase comovement and that there is significant comovement across markets during both 
calm and crisis periods. They find several explanations for how international crises spread, 
with trade linkages being one of the main sources. Lending to peripheral countries, stock 
markets and commodities markets are also sources of spread. They note how countries that 
have high correlations with one another may not necessarily denote contagion as they could 
simply have a dependence upon one another. They use Canada and the UK as an example. 
These countries have high correlation, which the authors believe arises due to their strong 
trade linkages creating a dependence upon one another. Similarly, they find that there is a 
surprisingly small link between Canada and the US given their strong trade with one another. 
They find the US market has stronger correlations with advanced countries in pre-crisis 
periods. While during crisis periods the correlations between advanced and emerging 
economies increase with the US, meanwhile correlations with Canada still remain relatively 
weak. (Bordo & Murshid, 2000) 
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2.2 Quantitatively Intense Research 
From a quantitative technical level two papers further delve into the issue. One study looks at 
the interconnectedness of markets through changes in comoments of asset returns looking 
further than volatilities and correlations changing. In their study they use option pricing 
models. They note how asset markets are interconnected and that they are connected beyond 
correlation and volatility. Their findings conclude that the current asset pricing models do not 
take into account the fact that there are higher order moments in times of financial crisis 
which can lead to poorly priced assets. (Fry-McKibbin, Martin, & Tang, 2014)  
 Allali, Oueslati and Trabelsi also examine financial market interactions using a partial 
directed coherence model. They are looking at ten major stock market indexes. Their results 
find that there are strong connections between the world’s major financial markets, and they 
note how investors may not be receiving the diversification benefit they seek by investing in 
several of these markets. In particular, they note how the US, UK, Germany and Hong Kong 
have a particularly strong impact on the major market index movements.  (Allali, Oueslati, & 
Trabelsi, 2011) 
2.3 Financial Markets in Emerging Economies  
Calvo and Mendoza create a model in which they analyze herd behavior in financial markets. 
Their research finds that portfolios are more likely to change their allocations as the assets 
that they are invested in become globalized. So as we have seen a large increase in the ability 
to invest capital in smaller emerging markets, we are creating a greater potential for herd 
inflows and outflows to these markets. This is an issue because herd behavior with an outflow 
from a country due to fear in credit worthiness or slow growth can be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. From the perspective of the countries, this is dangerous as it can take them a 
significant amount of time to regain their reputation and attract foreign investments. The 
authors observe how when investors are comparing their returns to a benchmark and they 
have a reputational benefit for beating the benchmark they are more susceptible to herd 
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behavior. (Calvo & Mendoza, 1998)  
 In emerging economies, the capital inflow and outflow are very sensitive to their 
ratings, which are generally volatile.  A country is deemed to be integrated once the return it 
is providing relative to its risk is the same as a country in another geographic area. (Bekaert & 
Harvey, 2003) When the markets are not fully integrated, we can see large swings in foreign 
markets which have little effect on trade partners. This is primarily caused by their lack of 
financial integration.  
 With their research from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Dicle and Levendis note 
that increasing the technology of an exchange is not enough to make it globally competitive. 
In order for it to be truly appealing to foreign investors, they also need to increase the 
information provided. This decreases the information asymmetry between foreign and 
domestic investors, which ultimately makes it more appealing to foreign investment. (Dicle & 
Levendis, 2013) 
2.4 Policy Implications 
Chang and Majnoni have a model which they use to analyze financial crises. Their model 
relies on two conditions which are necessary for a crisis: weak fundamentals and adverse self-
fulfilling expectations. Contagion can be created from a crisis if investors change their 
ideology on the fundamentals of another country. For example, if Greece defaulting on their 
debt makes a US investor reconsider the likelihood of Portugal defaulting on their debt 
despite Portuguese fundamentals remaining unchanged, we would observe contagion in the 
markets. Similarly, to the previously mentioned herd behavior (Calvo & Mendoza, 1998), 
contagion can arise as an outcome of a combination of fundamentals and a self-fulfilling 
belief. Chang and Majnoni note how the contagiousness of a crisis is dependent upon the 
withholding or release of information to the public. Based on their predictive model, there 
have been some backtested crises which could have been prevented if more information had 
been released, and there have been others which would have been unavoidable. The authors 
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note that when creating policy and trying to prevent the contagiousness of a crisis, 
transparency should be increased to provide the public with more information. (Chang & 
Majnoni, 2001) 
 Peckham examines how policy should be adapted from a much different angle. In his 
research on pandemic and financial crises, he finds that tracing the path of financial contagion 
is not unlike tracing that of biological contagion. He argues how society has a wide array of 
analytical tools which we use for examining how biological contagion spreads from one 
country to another and we could use these tools as a predictive measure for the spread of 
financial contagion. Historically, the spread has been quite similar with one central event, 
which then radiates outwards as the outbreak grows. He views trade linkages and financial 
interconnections, through common creditors and lenders, as the main methods of transmission 
of financial crises. (Peckham, 2013) 
 VanHoose examines how the international interconnection amongst markets provides 
regulators an opportunity to coordinate their policies. He notes how the interconnection 
creates the possibility for conflict among policies to be created. The policies which have been 
attempted in Europe are used to show how, thus far, coordination of financial policies has 
failed. VanHoose notes how the coordination between countries could take place via 
monetary policy and also via fiscal policy. The main challenge which he sees preventing the 
development of regulation coordination is the incentive for one country to cheat. There is also 




The research conducted is primarily focused on left tail behavior, looking at which factors 
drive the returns from average to several standard deviations away and deeper into the tails.  
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As I am looking at the effects of other countries’ financial markets conditional on the US 
market, the method selected for this analysis is a quantile regression because it is easy of use 
and the results are easily interpreted.  
 For a traditional Ordinary Least Squares Model we would look at the relationship 
between the independent variables (X1, X2, X3 etc.) and the conditional mean of the 
dependent variable Y.  
 Here, I am interested in looking at the relationship from the opposite direction. 
Looking at the relationship X has on Y, conditional on the quantile of Y, rather than simply 
the conditional mean. This allows us, by changing the quantile level, to see the effect that X 
has on Y at various points throughout the curve, allowing us to better examine how X affects 
Y in the tail versus closer to the mean. For an unbiased result in the regression, X must be 
non-zero and continuous.  
 The quantile regression operation is as follows. You select the quantile which you 
would like to observe. For this example, we will use the 90th percentile. This means we are 
interested in seeing what effect the independent variables have on the dependent variable 
when the dependent variable is at or above its 90th percentile. So, from the perspective of 
stock returns, as is the application use for this thesis, we are observing the effect which certain 
variables have when stock market index X has returns that are at or above the 90th percentile. 
For daily data, this threshold would be breached once every ten trading days, with the best 
trading day of the 10 being the event which is the primary focus of the quantile regression.  
 This regression begins by setting the US financial market as the dependent variable 
and observing how it is distributed. For clarification I note that a quantile is the same as a 
percentile meaning the 85th percentile is equivalent to the 85th quantile. Similarly, the most 
well-known quantile/percentile would be the 50th, which is also known as the median. 
The equation for the quantile regression is as follows: 
!" = $"%& + ("                           (Equation 1) 
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Such that %& is a vector containing all unknown parameters associated with the qth quantile 
for the independent variables. The quantile regression minimizes the sum in an asymmetrical 
sense such that when there is an over prediction, the error is penalized with a factor of q, and 
when there is an under prediction, it is penalized with a factor of 1-q.   
Which looks like: 
) ("" + (1 − )) (""                                                                                            (Equation 2) 
In its entirety, the quantile regression is performing the following:  
. %& = ) !" − $"%/":123425 + ) !" − $"%
/
":126425 ∶ 8ℎ:;(<0 < ) < 1            (Equation 3) 
The standard conditional quantile can be specified as: 
.& !" $" = $"%&                     (Equation 4) 
which is linear.  Looking at the rate of change we see when the first derivative is found with 
respect to j, we observe a marginal effect of:  
?@A ! $
?4B
= %&C                             (Equation 5) 
This is the effect of the dependent variable on the independent variable conditional on the 
independent variable remaining in the same quantile. It is important to note that the regression 
results are only applicable when the independent variable is in the same pre-specified 
quantile. (Katchova, 2013) 
Variance 
The variance for the portfolio is calculated using a factor return method used by MSCI Barra; 
this method uses the following equation:  
DE = ℎF GFHG + Δ ℎ                                (Equation 6) 
Where h is the vector of the holdings in the portfolio, X is the matrix of exposures, F is the 
covariance matrix of returns, and Δ is a diagonal matrix of the specific return variances. Note 
that a superscript of T denotes the transpose of the respective matrix. (Barbieri et al., 2009) 
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Diversification Effect 
As commonly known, the normal variance equation is: 
 DJKLMNKO"KE = 8PEDPE(QRR(S<1) + 8EEDEE(QRR(S<2) + 28P8EUVW(QRR(S<1, QRR(S<2) (Equation 7) 
When working with a multi-asset portfolio, this expands to:  
 DJKLMNKO"KE = 8"ED"EY"ZP + 28"8CUVW(QRR(S<:, QRR(S<[)YCZ"\PY"ZP               (Equation 8) 







UVWefgLehg   (Equation 9) 
This is the basis of the widely-known fact that diversification can decrease risk exposure. By 
looking at the previously presented equations, it becomes evident that the risk will decrease as 
the number of assets included in the portfolio grows. Thus when looking at the results in the 
coming sections, we need to be aware of how our four data-set-created variances will be 
significantly smaller than that of the US market variance. The lower variance will, in turn, 
lead to the CoVaR levels being lower.  
Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) 
iVjQk&
C|"is the Value at Risk (VaR) of institution j, conditional on a state which institution i 
is in i(G"); this conditional event is chosen when i is in a “stress” situation such that G" =
jQk&" . So we then arrive to 
 Pr GC ≤ iVjQk&
C|" G" = jQk&" = )              (Equation 10) 
This will show us the VaR for institution j when institution i is in distress, at or below its pre-
defined q% VaR level.  (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2011) 
In the case of this research, I consider institution i to be the US financial market, represented 
by the S&P 500 index, and institution j to be a bundle of various countries’ stock market 
indexes. This will be further explained in the methodology section.  
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3.2 Data Set 
Several data sets are used for this research. The 25 major trade partners of the US from 
January 1, 2004, to the end of December 2015 are used as the base sample. These 25 are 
derived from all countries which were, at one point, either a top 15 importer or exporter of 
trade goods with the US over the 2004 to 2015-time period. This was determined from the 
annual year-to-date trade numbers reported on the US census in December of each year. For 
each of the countries, in the 25 country sample, a major market index for that country was 
selected. The indexes were selected based on a couple criteria. Firstly, the market index 
needed to be composed primarily of companies which were based in the country. For 
example, in the US the S&P 500 was chosen as all companies belonging to this index are 
based in the US. This is important as the assumption of using a market index for the country’s 
economic activity would need to be reflected in the underlying financial result of those 
companies, which in turn represent either a growing or shrinking economy.  Secondly, 
indexes with the largest time span were selected. If a country had two major market indexes, 
and one was an older and more established index, this one was selected. This criteria is 
included because one calculation uses a 21 year time-frame; the index would need to have 
been in existence since at least January 1, 1995, to be included in the long time-frame 
calculation.  A quick overview of each of the market indexes selected is shown in Appendix 
1. 
 Based on the aforementioned criteria, a sample of the 25 countries’ indexes is created. 
Several data sets are then created using this data. One is created from the start of 1995 
through the end of July 2016. This data set will be used to evaluate whether globalization and 
increasing international trade are leading to further linkages through trade between the US 
markets and foreign trade partners' markets.  Another data set is created with data from 2004 
through the end of 2015. This is a composite cross-sectional index, where the country’s 
import/export trade rank is used to create a return series. This is done by examining one 
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country’s trade rank and then using the country’s major return in that year for the index. For 
example, in 2008, Germany was the 5th largest export partner of the US, so for the export rank 
5th index from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008, the returns are equal to that of 
the German index. While in 2015, Germany fell to the 6th largest exporter and so from 
January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015, Germany's market returns are in the export rank 
6th index. Next, returns are examined to see what behavior the trade partners’ indexes have on 
the US markets. The research I conducted focuses solely on various quantiles in the left tail, 
the worst 10%, 5% and 1% of daily returns and the worst 10% of monthly returns.   
 Lastly, several key commodities are used to see if the returns on these commodities 
have an effect on the US market when observing tail behavior.  All returns are total returns 
composed of index and currency returns. All market price, currency value and commodity 
price data is collected from Bloomberg. The rankings of the top 15 import and export partners 
have been assembled in a table presented in Appendix 2. 
3.3 Research execution  
The price data is transformed into return data using logarithmic returns. Due to the varying 
trading days, a couple market indexes needed to be modified. Four countries’ indexes 
required an adaptation due to slightly different trading days throughout the year. The 
countries affected by the modifications are: South Korea, Taiwan, India and Saudi Arabia. 
The modification was performed by making the price which the index closed at equal to the 
price from the previous close, representing a return of zero for the days which the index was 
not traded.  
 Quantile regressions were then used to analyze the index return data sets. These 
regressions were performed using Matlab. The quantile regression function used was created 
by Shapour Mohammadi from the University of Tehran in 2008. (Mohammadi, 2008) 
 The quantile regressions are run in a rolling window, a 60-day roll frequency is used 
for daily data and a 2-month roll frequency for monthly data. The time width of the rolling 
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window varies in order to accommodate the number of exceedances that occur within the 
window. For the daily data, this number is set at 10. For example, when looking at the 90th 
quantile, 100 days are used as the rolling window time frame which gives a sample of 10 days 
that are deemed to be in exceedance of the 90th quantile. This is done so that no one day plays 
too much of a role in the determination of the regression coefficients.  
 Unfortunately when working with a monthly time frame, the number of exceedances 
needs to be reduced due to the smaller sample size of only 144 months. This leads to the 
number of observed exceedances decreasing to 5 when using the monthly timeframe. 
Additionally, due to the shorter timeframe the 95th and 99th quantiles cannot be used for the 
monthly return series. This is due to the fact that the 2008 financial crises falls within the 
initial window and remains within the window for the entire sample, which leads to the same 
exceedances being used throughout the entire rolling window. Thus, such analysis does not 
present results which are of any use.  
 At each point in the rolling window, a quantile regression is performed with 4 data 
sets: the import composite index, export composite index, the sample of 25 countries, and 
lastly the 33 commodities. From each point, using the result of the respective quantile 
regression, a variance is found for each data set. The variance is then used to calculate the 
conditional value at risk level for that data point. The sample of each data set composed 
CoVaR is then regressed on the actual US market CoVaR. This is done to see which measure 
is best for comparison with the CoVaR found in the US market. Each of the 4 Portfolio 
CoVaRs is regressed individually against that of the US.  In addition, the 
Export/Import/Country in combination with the commodity Portfolio CoVaR are regressed 
against that of the US. An examination of the results using this methodology will be explored 
in the next section.  
 To examine how the relationships between markets are changing over time, a similar 
approach to that discussed in the previous section is used. A time frame from the beginning of 
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1995 until the end of July 2016 is used. For this time frame, a sample of 21 countries is used. 
These are all from the previous sample of 25 countries used minus Italy, Nigeria, Russia and 
Vietnam.  These four countries are excluded as they did not have a uniform and continuous 
return index for the entire time frame.  
 Only one time frame, monthly, is used due to the fact that several indices had different 
trading cycles for the earlier time portion. For example, some only traded every two days or 
did not trade on Fridays. This was a concern that Karolyi and Stulz expressed with their 
research when dealing with return data across many countries in the 1990s. (Karolyi & Stulz, 
1995) When looking at which quantile to use the 90th, quantile was selected. A rolling 
window with a length of 50 months was set-up and the roll frequency was every 4 months. 
This rolling window length is selected such that there are 5 exceedances in each window 
observation. This leads to 53 data points being collected.  These 53 data points are then 
converted into CoVaR measures, which are then regressed against the US market CoVaR. 
The regressions are run on a rolling window basis where 25 CoVaR calculated data points are 
included in each regression, and the points are rolled over one at a time. This leads to 28 
regressions being run with the country calculated CoVaR against the actual CoVaR observed 
in the US market over the same period. The figures found from this analysis are presented in 
the following results section.  
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4. Results   
4.1 Daily Time Frame 
 
Figure 1 (Daily CoVaR at 90th Quantile) 
Looking at figure 1 we can see that the “Portfolio CoVaR” which is created as a composition 
of either Exports/Imports/Country/Commodity returns has a shape which closely resembles 
that of the actual CoVaR in the US stock market. There is an increase in early 2007 which 
every data set picks up. The major market crash in 2008 is significantly larger in the US. This 
is to be expected as it was primarily a US caused crash thus it makes sense that we see it have 
the largest effect on the US in addition to there being no real signs in other markets of the 
crash prior it happening. In early 2011 we can see that foreign markets had an increase in their 
CoVaR. Seeing as how the foreign credit crisis was taking place during this time and its 
origination was in Europe this makes sense. We can see how the European markets fell first, 
triggering what should have been a fall in the US markets, although it took a little long for the 
crisis to be felt in the US. 
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Daily CoVaR at 90th Quantile
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CoVaR is regressed on the US market CoVaR that the export composite index combined with 
the commodity results create the best match of Daily US CoVaR at the 90% threshold as they 
match around 64.3% of the risk. Meanwhile, the composite import and commodity falls short 
of the export measure with 53.7% of risk matched.  
 
 
Figure 2 (Daily CoVaR at 95th Quantile) 
Looking at figure 2 we can see the daily CoVaR at the 95th quantile level. There is slightly 
less movement and the CoVaR level tends to persist a little longer. This is due to the longer 
time frame in the rolling window to accommodate the number of exceedances observed. 
Similar to the 90th quantile results we see that there is change in foreign CoVaR prior to the 
2008 crisis although for 2011 yet again all Portfolio CoVaRs are lower.  
 The regression results of the daily Portfolio CoVaRs on that of the US at the 95% 
level, found in appendix 4, have two items of note. Firstly, the import composite index 
combined with the commodity returns provide the better risk match for that of US CoVaR as 
they correspond to 75.8% match of the risk. Meanwhile, the export composite with the 
commodity returns accounts for slightly less, 72.5% of the risk. Secondly, we see how the 
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line with the current theory proposed by Forbes and Rigobon of how inter-market correlations 
increase in times of troubled markets. (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002) 
 Moving on to the daily CoVaR at the 99% level, seen in figure 3, the first item of note 
is how there is significantly less movement in the CoVaR of the US market. Again this is due 
to the modification in the time window to accommodate for setting the minimum number of 
exceedances to 5.  Again, Portfolio CoVaR has a similar shape to that of the US market 
CoVaR. There is a noticeably prolonged period of significantly higher CoVaR during the 
2008-11 period to 2012-11. This is due in large part to the exceedance values in the 99th 
quantile remaining unchanged during the time frame. This causes the flat shape of the graph 
during this observation period.  Baig and Goldfajn noted in their research how as the length of 
the rolling window increases the effects will be smaller. (Baig & Goldfajn, 1999)  
Figure 3 (Daily CoVaR at 99th Quantile) 
Yet again we see an increase in the matching of our Portfolio CoVaRs with the US portfolio 
this is similar with the aforementioned interconnectedness during tumultuous times. The 
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they are matching 93.7% of the US market risk. While the import composite and commodity 
account for a 92% match of US market risk. 
4.2 Monthly Time Frame 
The final chart which looks at the import vs export relation is figure 4. The time frame for this 
final figure is one month at the 90th quantile.  A similar trough is observed from the end of 
2008 through to the end of 2012 as in the previously examined daily CoVaR at 99%. Once 
again this is due to a lack of turnover in the exceedance points which remained low from the 
2008 crisis until they exit the rolling window in the end of 2012.  
 From a risk matching perspective, the import versus export comparison is close yet 
again. The import composite with commodity returns provides a slightly better match to that 
of the US, accounting for a 57.7% match. While the export composite and commodity returns 
provide a 55.9% match to the tail risk of the US market. 
Figure 4 (Monthly CoVaR at 90th Quantile) 
4.3 Import vs Export 
The question as to whether import or export partners provide a better matching of market risk 
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definitive answer leads to the conclusion that both play an important role in risk management 
and countries should be cautious when engaging in a trade relationship with one another as 
their financial markets do become more interconnected. Within each time frame and quantile 
set the import composite with commodity or export composite with commodity return 
provides the dominant risk match. This further demonstrates how current trade relationships 
are the most important and historical trade relations are dwarfed in comparison to those which 
are currently taking place.  
4.4 Rolling Window over time 
A process similar to that previously discussed in the Portfolio CoVaR calculation was used. 
The sole component for the Portfolio CoVaR calculation over the 1995 to the end of July 
2016 is the Country calculated CoVaR.  
 Each rolling window data point has a total time frame of 50 months, 25 rolling 
window data points are then used in the regression so each point on the graph represents the 
relation between the financial markets over the last 150 months, or 12 and a half years.  So the 
first data point runs from the start of 1995 through the end of June 2007, with the second 
taking place 4 months later from April 1995 through the end of October 2007. This regression 
is run advancing one observation at a time which results in 28 observations comparing how 
well the country Portfolio CoVaR does at matching to the US market CoVaR.  
 The key results from the 28 regressions have been plotted in figure 5. Looking at this 
figure there are a few key items of note. Firstly, we see how over time the fit of the country 
Portfolio CoVaR is increasing its risk match with the US market. This is a demonstration of 
how the financial markets are becoming more interconnected. The results are highly 
significant, after the first 6 observations, which from a date perspective corresponds to the end 
of 1996, all data points remain significant to the 95% confidence level.  
 As shown a portfolio of 21 stocks is going to have a much lower calculated standard 
deviation due to the diversification effect. We note that over the sample the coefficient 
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required to multiply this deviation converges to approximately a factor of 3.5. This shows 
when the US markets experience a monthly return which would be in exceedance of their 90th 
quantile the CoVaR of the US markets should be roughly 3.5 times greater than the 21-
country Portfolio CoVaR.  
 
Figure 5 (CoVaR Relation over time) 
5. Further research and Conclusion 
Further Research 
 This thesis focused on using current market data to match risk exposures. One 
potential area of future research could attempt to use current market exposure to forecast the 
future CoVaR. This would be similar to Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 
2011) Forward-CoVaR measure except using various country market index and debt data 
which is much higher frequency than monthly or quarterly reported macroeconomic data. 
This would allow risk managers to forecast or nowcast their risk measures in real time based 
on historical financial market relations.  
 Institutional investors could delve further into the individual country by country 
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which is only enacted when market returns approach the tails since  the interconnectedness of 
financial markets increases in times of crisis.  
 Policy makers could look at other countries and their financial markets and make more 
proactive decisions with the knowledge that their decisions will be affecting other economies. 
With increased communication between regulators further steps could be taken to ensure the 
stability of the global financial system recognizing its increasingly interconnected nature 
versus the current country by country management. This is similar to a combination of the 
idea of increased transparency to decrease crisis effects, expressed by Chang and Majnoni, 
and the idea of VanHoose to increase the cooperation amongst regulators. (Chang & Majnoni, 
2001; VanHoose, 2015) With increased transparency on the part of regulators there’s less 
incentive for regulators to cheat one another as they can work together to achieve mutually 
beneficial optimal solutions for financial system stability.  
Conclusion 
 Based on the previously determined definition of contagion by Forbes and Rigobon 
(Forbes & Rigobon, 2002) this research does not satisfy the conditions to conclude that there 
is contagion. It does satisfy their definition of increasing interconnectedness, which they also 
determine to be present in financial markets.  I also find that there has been an increase in the 
interconnectedness of financial markets in times of turmoil over the last 21 years, from the 
start of 1995 through the end of July 2016. This result is consistent with that of Chan-Lau et 
al. who found that from 1998 through 2001 interconnections were increasing among 
countries. (Chan-Lau et al., 2004) The result is contrary to that of Bordo and Murshid who 
found that from World War 1 through the end of the Asian crisis, there was no noticeable 
increase in the interconnection of financial markets. (Bordo & Murshid, 2000) 
 In terms of determining the source of the interconnection, I find that trade linkages do 
increase the likelihood of interconnectedness amongst financial markets. This is seen as the 
Portfolio CoVaR of import/export composite indexes with commodity returns provides a 
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dominant risk match to that of the US financial market. This result is found at the 90th, 95th 
and 99th quantiles during the daily time frame and 90th quantile during the monthly time 
frame. This reaffirms the ideas of trade being a source of financial stress transmission. (Baig 




Appendix 1: Index Description 
 
Country Index Ticker Index Description 
Canada SPTSX The S&P/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index is a capitalization-
weighted index designed to measure market activity of stocks listed on 
the TSX.  
China SHCOMP 
 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index is a capitalization-
weighted index. The index tracks the daily price performance of all A-
shares and B-shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
Mexico MEXBOL 
 
The Mexican IPC index is a capitalization weighted index of the 
leading stocks traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange.  
Japan NKY 
 
The Nikkei-225 Stock Average is a price-weighted average of 225 top-
rated Japanese companies listed in the First Section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. The Nikkei Stock Average was first published on May 16, 
1949, where the average price was ¥176.21 with a divisor of 225. 
Germany DAX 
 
The German Stock Index is a total return index of 30 selected German 
blue chip stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The equities 





The FTSE 100 Index is a capitalization-weighted index of the 100 most 





The KOSPI 200 Index is a capitalization-weighted index of 200 
Korean stocks which make up 93% of the total market value of the 
Korea Stock Exchange. 
Taiwan TWSE The TWSE, or TAIEX, Index is capitalization-weighted index of all 
listed common shares traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange.  
France CAC 
 
The CAC 40, the most widely-used indicator of the Paris market, 
reflects the performance of the 40 largest equities listed in France, 
measured by free-float market capitalization and liquidity. 
Malaysia FBMKLCI 
 
The FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index comprises of the largest 30 
companies by full market capitalization on Bursa Malaysia's Main 
Board. 
Italy FTSEMIB The Index consists of the 40 most liquid and capitalized stocks listed 
on the Borsa Italiana. 
Ireland ISEQ 
 
The ISEQ Overall Index is a capitalization-weighted index of all 
Official list equities in the Irish Stock Exchange but excludes UK 
registered companies.  
Venezuela IBVC The IBC Index from the Caracas Stock Exchange (Venezuela), also 
known as the General Index, is a capitalization-weighted index of the 
15 most liquid and highest capitalized stocks traded on the Caracas 
Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Caracas). 
Brazil IBOV 
 
It is a gross total return index weighted by market value to the free 






This is the Tadawul All Share Index (TASI). It is disseminated by the 
Saudi Stock Market.  
Nigeria NGSEINDX 
 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange All Share Index was formulated in 
January 1984 with a base value of 100. Only ordinary shares are 
included in the computation of the index. The index is value-relative 
and is computed daily.  
India SENSEX 
 
The S&P BSE Sensex Index is a cap-weighted index. The index 
members have been selected on the basis of liquidity, depth, and 
floating-stock-adjustment depth and industry representation.  
Russia INDEXCF 
 
MICEX Index is cap-weighted composite index calculated based on 
prices of the 50 most liquid Russian stocks of the largest and 
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The Swiss Market Index is an index of the largest and most liquid 
stocks traded on the Geneva, Zurich, and Basel Stock Exchanges.  
Vietnam VNINDEX The Vietnam Stock Index or VN-Index is a capitalization-weighted 




The AEX-Index is a free-float adjusted market capitalization weighted 
index of the leading Dutch stocks traded on the Amsterdam Exchange. 
Singapore STI/STIOLD 
 
The Straits Times Index (STI), maintained & calculated by FTSE, is 
the most globally-recognized benchmark index and market barometer 
for Singapore. It tracks the performance of the top 30 largest and most 
liquid companies listed on the Singapore Exchange. 
Belgium BEL20 
 
The BEL 20 Index is a modified capitalization-weighted index of the 
20 most capitalized and liquid Belgian stocks that are traded on the 
Brussels Stock Exchange. The equities use free float shares in the 
index calculation.  
Hong Kong HIS 
 
The Hang Seng Index is a free-float capitalization weighted index of a 
selection of companies from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. The 
components of the index are divided into four sub-indices: Commerce 
and Industry, Finance, Utilities, and Properties.  
Australia AS51 
 
The S&P/ASX 200 measures the performance of the 200 largest index-
eligible stocks listed on the ASX by float-adjusted market 
capitalization. Representative liquid and tradable, it is widely 
considered Australia's preeminent benchmark index. The index is float-
adjusted.  










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.009678579 0.003464429 2.793700796 0.00741499
Export6Calculated 4.615541999 0.523190984 8.821906608 1.08806E<11
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
51 0.613644 0.605759184 1.08806E<11
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.005007094 0.003934691 1.272550894 0.209182883
Import6Calculated 3.739382039 0.571606178 6.541885273 3.40136E<08
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
51 0.466209207 0.455315517 3.40136E<08
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.005571589 0.00396603 1.404827786 0.166380469
Country6Calculated 4.922284784 0.742460359 6.629693725 2.48652E<08
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
51 0.472850958 0.462092814 2.48652E<08
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.016226229 0.00642398 2.525884017 0.014823442
Commodity6Calculated 6.113305688 1.079542699 5.66286604 7.7057E<07
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
51 0.395569538 0.383234222 7.7057E<07
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.018653385 0.004903801 3.803862627 0.000402907
Export6Calculated 3.723138943 0.61495641 6.054313581 2.0713E<07
Commodity6Calculated 2.508021444 1.01448251 2.472217528 0.017023971
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
51 0.657282375 0.643002474 6.89405E<12
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.018203298 0.005585863 3.258815796 0.002059034
Import6Calculated 2.639277915 0.634901572 4.156987528 0.000132165
Commodity6Calculated 3.500683173 1.126838508 3.106641411 0.003174474
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
51 0.555569549 0.537051614 3.52607E<09
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.017519739 0.00562065 3.117030767 0.003083079
Country6Calculated 3.474094615 0.862685289 4.02707066 0.000200095
Commodity6Calculated 3.31463869 1.171419595 2.829591295 0.006784547
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
51 0.548211105 0.529386567 5.22942E<09
Regression Results: Daily at 90th Quantile
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Appendix 4:  Regression Results: Daily at 95th Quantile 
 
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.013337507 0.004494719 2.967372627 0.004712151
Export5Calculated 4.941249947 0.557118168 8.869303195 1.32724E<11
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
49 0.625988363 0.618030669 1.32724E<11
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.015314364 0.004011665 3.817458349 0.000393611
Import5Calculated 5.072626136 0.485033465 10.45830134 7.39216E<14
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
49 0.699442498 0.693047658 7.39216E<14
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.011777313 0.003596361 3.274786346 0.001989254
Country5Calculated 5.993457466 0.557984384 10.74126379 3.02941E<14
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
49 0.710546125 0.704387532 3.02941E<14
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.022962009 0.00600407 3.824407056 0.000385255
Commodity5Calculated 6.783694126 0.830524333 8.167965534 1.43172E<10
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
49 0.586688416 0.577894552 1.43172E<10
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.026924842 0.004903904 5.49049118 1.66778E<06
Export5Calculated 3.175182117 0.619717005 5.12360011 5.79921E<06
Commodity5Calculated 3.868947739 0.878824634 4.402411572 6.32213E<05
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
49 0.736858179 0.72541723 4.61708E<14
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.025878912 0.004573609 5.65831362 9.38789E<07
Import5Calculated 3.563238468 0.594492437 5.993749029 2.95892E<07
Commodity5Calculated 3.198360973 0.868064485 3.684473939 0.00060199
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
49 0.7679301 0.757840105 2.56586E<15
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.02101886 0.004706676 4.465754693 5.14708E<05
Country5Calculated 4.354411002 0.783258598 5.559352958 1.31783E<06
Commodity5Calculated 2.735209797 0.975632776 2.803523891 0.007377293
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
49 0.752786094 0.742037663 1.09819E<14
Regression Results: Daily at 95th Quantile
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Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.059080341 0.005814856 10.16024129 7.75208E412
Export7Calculated 7.570295375 0.386262625 19.59882961 4.20235E420
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
36 0.918682488 0.916290797 4.20235E420
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.036036977 0.005204646 6.924001071 5.58163E408
Import7Calculated 5.741819935 0.327587094 17.5276134 1.34304E418
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
36 0.900356732 0.897426048 1.34304E418
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.016083134 0.003434454 4.682879291 4.41038E405
Country7Calculated 5.543449194 0.265197727 20.9030796 5.53468E421
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
36 0.927803773 0.925680354 5.53468E421
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.016739336 0.003919444 4.270844447 0.000148023
Commodity7Calculated 6.086133373 0.329544854 18.46830042 2.6762E419
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
36 0.909352217 0.906686106 2.6762E419
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.04241133 0.00689604 6.150098947 6.20693E407
Export7Calculated 4.2247143 1.004410103 4.206164682 0.000186726
Commodity7Calculated 2.866567763 0.811626777 3.531879238 0.001242395
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
36 0.940988965 0.937412539 5.25289E421
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.027023307 0.005342619 5.058064115 1.55458E405
Import7Calculated 2.607521132 0.9962055 2.617453056 0.013267752
Commodity7Calculated 3.453890766 1.050708087 3.28720299 0.002406623
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
36 0.92493608 0.920386751 2.78366E419
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.017705095 0.003277169 5.40255688 5.62232E406
Country7Calculated 3.49396501 0.876234463 3.987477275 0.000348627
Commodity7Calculated 2.369552373 0.971725783 2.438499023 0.020296187
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
36 0.938826618 0.935119141 9.5122E421
Regression Results: Daily at 99th Quantile
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Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.028310425 0.018003525 1.572493478 0.122689874
Export6Calculated 4.654473585 0.591469231 7.869341877 4.61124E<10
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
48 0.573784175 0.564518613 4.61124E<10
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.045695816 0.019460509 2.34813051 0.02322295
Import6Calculated 4.870433942 0.596724585 8.161946175 1.70872E<10
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
48 0.591537239 0.582657614 1.70872E<10
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.018967472 0.016799279 1.129064656 0.264724376
Country6Calculated 5.084056282 0.644430923 7.889218378 4.30959E<10
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
48 0.575017561 0.565778812 4.30959E<10
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.012530218 0.031956713 0.392099697 0.69679537
Commodity6Calculated 3.672930619 0.942821535 3.895679598 0.000315329
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
48 0.248075066 0.231728872 0.000315329
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.039870751 0.02463152 1.618688234 0.112502967
Export6Calculated 4.356808109 0.733986498 5.935815059 3.88803E<07
Commodity6Calculated 0.609788993 0.880872295 0.692255843 0.492333532
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
48 0.578275245 0.559531922 3.65725E<09
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.055586582 0.024691503 2.251243323 0.02930031
Import6Calculated 4.58810348 0.738146984 6.21570443 1.49275E<07
Commodity6Calculated 0.565254934 0.859582181 0.657592662 0.514149738
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
48 0.595425008 0.577443897 1.43707E<09
Coefficients Standard.Error t.Stat P1value
Intercept 0.029880608 0.024362079 1.226521283 0.226381752
Country6Calculated 4.786800084 0.805623836 5.941730955 3.81025E<07
Commodity6Calculated 0.551468764 0.886101921 0.622353648 0.536850329
Observations R.Square Adjusted.R.Square Significance.F
48 0.578644255 0.559917333 3.58592E<09
Regression Results: Monthly at 90th Quantile
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